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The European fiscal union creation process*
OLEKSANDR SHAROV1
ABSTRACT. The paper presents evolution of the European Union fiscal system crea-
tion process as well as outlines problems in functioning thereof that have arisen
during recent years and the main reforming (modification) trends. The analysis is
primarily focused on creation of the fiscal union within the EU. In this regard, the
idea of two different groups of countries moving to the common goal at different
paces is becoming ever increasingly much-talked-about in the EU. The first group
comprises donor countries that adhere to all treaties and fiscal discipline, while dem-
onstrating respective positive macroeconomic indicators. The second group implies
countries of Euro-periphery, where the above processes take place along with signifi-
cant complications or do not occur at all. In these countries Eurosceptic positions are
also quite strong, which often leads to taking measures contrary to the jointly
adopted decisions.
Currently, there is no clear understanding within the EU as to which way out of the
crisis should be taken. However, profound understanding of the crisis causes and ac-
tive work on preparation and implementation of measures to overcome the negative
effects of this crisis suggest availability of sufficiently favorable prospects for further
development of the EU fiscal system (including formal creation of the Fiscal Un-
ion).
Based on the conducted analysis conclusions have been made as to potential vectors
of action aimed at improving EU fiscal system, while specific recommendations on
actions to be taken by Ukraine have been developed (particularly, as regards budget
forecasting and planning) with the purpose of harmonizing Ukrainian financial insti-
tutions and mechanisms with the EU fiscal system.
KEYWORDS. European Union, Maastricht Treaty, Fiscal Union, Stability and
Growth Pact, European Financial Stability Facility, European Semester.
Introduction
Based on the 1957 Treaty of Rome signed by six countries of
Western Europe, the European Union has been gradually ex-
panding and eventually achieved membership of 28 countries.
Another four countries have the status of candidates: Turkey
(since 1987), Macedonia (since 2004), Montenegro (since 2008)
and Serbia (since 2009). In 2009, applications for EU member-
ship were also submitted by Albania and Iceland, though formal
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decision by the European Union on Albania’s application is still
pending, while in 2013 the government of Iceland decided to
"freeze" further negotiations until a referendum on this issue has
been held in the country. A "potential" candidate to the EU is
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
At the same time, three Western European countries have de-
cided not to join the European Union, while being partly still
involved in the EU economic system: Liechtenstein and Norway
as parties to the European Economic Area created in 1994, and
Switzerland — on the basis of relevant bilateral agreements. Also
based on separate agreements the single European currency (euro)
is used along with supporting other forms of actual participation
in the EU economic system by the so-called "dwarf" states An-
dorra, the Vatican, Monaco and San Marino. Finally, in the legal
sense a part of the EU comprises a series of "overseas territories"
or "outermost regions", which also use the euro, but for which
certain exceptions to the rules or specific features have been es-
tablished exactly on account of their remoteness (in particular,
this concerns taxation issues). Such territories include island ar-
eas such as the Azores and Madeira (Portugal), Canary Isles
(Spain), Guadeloupe, Mayotte, Martinique, St. Martin, Reunion
(France) and a continental territory — French Guiana.
Furthermore, one should take into account ties of the Euro-
pean Union with 17 countries, with which the EU has concluded
association agreements and/or free trade area agreements (in par-
ticular, Israel, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Serbia, Chile,
etc.), as well as 53 member countries of the Commonwealth of
Nations headed by the British monarch, which are indirectly
(through relations with Great Britain) incorporated in certain
segments of European integration (especially in matters of labor
migration and international trade).
The European Union fiscal system development process at-
tracts many researchers, while first of all, one should mention
representatives of academic science (R. Mundell2, B. Eichen-
green3), as well as financiers and bankers (G. Soros4, J.-C.
Triche5). Certain aspects of financial integration within the
                     
2 Inter alia: Mundell R. A Theory of optimum currency areas. American Economic Review 51, 1961,
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3 Eichengreen B. Should the Maastricht Treaty Be Saved? Princeton Studies in International Finance,
No. 74, December 1992 (International Finance Section, Princeton), 74 p.; Eichengreen B. European
monetary Unification: A Tour D’Horizon, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14, 1998, pp. 24-40.
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210 p.
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European Union are considered in numerous publications by re-
searchers not only from the EU, but also from other countries
(including Ukraine).
Basic part
The first element of real European economic integration was in
fact the "Marshall Plan", as it envisaged abolition of trade barri-
ers and creation of economic policy coordination institutions
within Europe. According to the original plan, it was supposed to
apply to all European countries, including the Soviet Union and
countries of "socialist democracy". Already at this stage, the need
for creating a specific financial and credit system occurred. In
particular, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
established a special European fund to mitigate the negative ef-
fects of increased competition for European companies. An impor-
tant component of the new system was the London Debt Agreement 
of February 27, 1953, which regulated the private and pub-lic 
debt of Germany formed during the Second World War and
taken over by the Federal Republic of Germany as the German
Empire (Deutsches Reich) successor, including private debts (al-
though formally, the successor state was not responsible for
them6). The said Agreement also stipulated maintenance princi-
ples of the new debts, which arose as a result of foreign economic
assistance programs during the post-war period (especially, the
Marshall Plan). The declaration forming a supplement to the
draft Agreement and filed by representatives of the USA, Great
Britain and France read: "The three countries agree that the plan
include an appropriate satisfaction of demands towards Germany so 
that its implementation does not jeopardize the financial situation 
of the German economy through unwanted repercussions nor has 
an excessive effect on its potential currency reserves. The first three 
countries are convinced that the German federal government 
shares their view and that the restoration of German solv-
ability includes an adequate solution for the German debt which
takes Germany’s economic problems into account and makes sure
that negotiations are fair to all participants7".
In practice, this implied writing off 62.6% of the debts,
granting the possibility of debt repayment in Deutschmarks,
                     5 Triche J.-C. “Economic Integration in the Euro Area”, 15th European Regional Conference of the
Board of Governors – Tel Aviv University. Paris, 31 March 2006.
6 Guinnane T.W. Financial vergangenheitsbewältigung: the 1953 London Debt Agreement- Yale
University, Center Discussion Paper No. 880, January 2004, p.21 - [Electronic resource]. Access mode:
http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp880.pdf
7 Hersel Ph. El Acuerdo de Londres de 1953 (III) // La Insignia, 3 enero del 2003. – [Electronic re-
source]. Access mode: http://www.lainsignia.org/2003/enero/econ_005.htm
OLEKSANDR SHAROV 
THE EUROPEAN FISCAL UNION CREATION PROCESS 77
promotion of German exports development (by creditor coun-
tries) and limiting the cost of debt servicing by 5% of export
revenues.
In September 1961, the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, which by the time had fulfilled its function of or-
ganizing use of financial aid under the "Marshall Plan", was
transformed into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development — OECD, membership in which was also extended
to non-European countries. Eventually, OECD actively started
addressing financial problems, in particular those related to at-
traction of international investment, taxation and export crediting. 
In 1976, the governments of OECD member countries
adopted the Declaration on International Investment and Multi-
national Enterprises. However, this neither established a new in-
ternational law in this field of relationship, nor reflected current
practices at national level, but at the same time proved to be a
very important step in development and enunciation of principles,
compliance with which was expected from the member countries8.
Above all, it concerned rules introduced within the EEC. In
1978, a document was adopted that became fundamental in terms
of issues regarding export crediting — Guidelines for Officially
Supported Export Credits, also known as the "Consensus" aimed
at promoting competition among exporters from OECD countries
to be based on the price and quality of goods, but not on favorable 
state support terms. Finally, the OECD has also developed a series 
of recommendations on coordinating issues of double taxation 
prevention. The latter provided regulatory prerequisites for
further economic development of countries striving for European
integration with the new integration tasks taken into account as
well as with consideration of the need for coordination and har-
monization of the respective rules with the main economic part-
ners (firstly, with USA and Turkey, and later on -with Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, etc.).
During recent years the global shocks caused by the crisis to
the global economy were exacerbated by a serious problem within
the EU associated with the need for correcting the very concept
of European integration on account of significant quantitative
and qualitative expansion of the European Union. It was ex-
pected that new circumstances would be taken into account by
the EU Constitution, a draft of which had been signed in 2004.
                     
8 Horn N. International rules for multinational enterprises: the ICC, OECD, and ILO initiatives/ The
American University Law Review ,vol. 30:923, 1981, p.936 – [Electronic resource]. Access mode:
http://aulawreview.com/pdfs/30/30-4/Horn.pdf
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The most important novelty of the Constitution was supposed to
be granting the international legal entity status to the European
Union. Besides, the principle of the EU legislation prevalence
over national legislation was to be stipulated as well. However,
this draft was rejected at referendums held in France and the
Netherlands, which led to another European Union identity cri-
sis. Only at the EU summit in 2007 it was decided to carry out
the necessary institutional reform as the next modernization step
— through adoption of a new treaty. The said Treaty was signed
late in 2007 in Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon is intended for
keeping the balance between intergovernmental and supranational
principles of EU governance. At the same time, the Treaty estab-
lished the balance between the goals and interests of EU member
states by virtue of granting the "superpower" status to the EU
and recognizing its legal standing, thus enabling the EU to enter
into international agreements (under certain conditions).
It is also important that the Treaty of Lisbon has amended the
qualified voting mechanism in the Council of Europe (set forth
by the so-called "Treaty of Nice"). Under the new Treaty, deci-
sions would be adopted subject to having been voted for by more
than 55% of countries (at least 15 countries), representing at
least 65% of the population. At the same time it was stipulated
that the "blocking minority" should comprise at least 4 countries.
The EU also seeks to create an "internal market" and achieve a
number of objectives: full employment, social progress, discrimi-
nation combating and so on. It is clear that achieving these ambi-
tious goals requires a new level of development and integration of
financial mechanisms — above all, the fiscal one and the bank
crediting one. This situation was significantly worsened by the
fact that the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009
first slowed and then actually rendered impossible achieving the
"European welfare" uniform high standard (which mostly socialist
and social-democratic governments of European countries have
been trying to achieve based on "European solidarity" principle
(subsidies from the EU budget) and "social budget policy" of in-
dividual countries. The limitedness of budget funds has led to a
deep crisis in "peripheral" EU countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain,
and partially — Italy), where budget deficits and debt burden
proved too heavy for low-efficient economies (mainly due to low
labor productivity and innovation lag). The difficulty of over-
coming the crisis was mainly caused by the fact that these coun-
tries were members of the European Monetary Union and use of
the single European currency deprived them of opportunities to
use traditional instruments — the exchange rate and interest rate,
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since presence of a single financial market virtually eliminates the
possibility of manipulating by certain countries. Thus, solution to
this problem involved selection of one of two further options: 1)
exclusion of fiscally indisciplined countries from the euro area, or
2) actual review of the principles underlying formation of the
European Union and preventing financing of sovereign debts and
budget deficits from the Union budget. "Without exaggeration,
the fight over the options described implies the quintessence of
the European political process. Positions taken in the fight repre-
sent those starting points by which the politicians of European
countries assert their identity. Disagreements on the issue do not
only determine the balance of political forces in the "united
Europe", but also create a semantic matrix of this strange
"unity"9. "In general, we can conclude that the institutional re-
form of the EU is still far from accomplishment. (…) This means
that one will have to think seriously about a new institutional re-
form of the European Union"10. Above all, the latter should in-
volve financial mechanisms of the European integration.
The founding fathers of the European Union saw gradual inte-
gration of national public finances as the basis of post-war unifi-
cation of Europe. This process was essential to overcome pro-
found differences and national isolation being causes of the two
world wars and by now remaining an obstacle to common eco-
nomic development.
Despite the fact that the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 created
certain "safety locks" (prohibition of budget deficit financing by
central banks and privileged access of public sector institutions to
the resources of financial institutions, establishing "ceiling" for
budget deficits and public debt, etc.), many professionals still
drew attention to the hazard for the EU occurring due to the ab-
sence of adequate fiscal control. In this regard, two additional
elements were subsequently introduced to the EU system: 1) ac-
cession to the euro functioning area required provision of certain
convergence criteria, and 2) in 1997, EU member countries
agreed to sign the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which con-
cerned common taxation and budget policy. The Pact was based
on Art. 99 and 104 of the Maastricht Treaty, while envisaging
monitoring of tax policies of individual member countries and
setting forth procedure for imposing sanctions against countries
                     
9 Smirnov A.N. Testing by euroscepticism: the crisis of European integration in the mirror of conser-
vatism / Politia, No. 4, 2013, p. 50. [In Russian].
10 Pronikova D.V. Institutional reform of the European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon / World and
Politics, 31.05.2012 – [Electronic resource]. Access mode: http://mir-politika.ru/313-institucionnaya_reforma.
html. [In Russian].
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violating the agreed rules (in particular, restriction for the an-
nual budget deficit at below 3% of GDP and that for national
debt — below 60% of GDP).
It should be noted that in fact the Stability and Growth Pact
consisted of the European Council resolution on the StabilityPact 
(adopted on June 17, 1997 in Amsterdam) and two Regulations∗
on technical aspects of monitoring budgetary policy and
coordinating economic policies of the Member States, as well as
on measures to be taken in the event of excessive budget deficits,
which were adopted by the European Council on July 7, 1997
(and amended in June 2005). According to these documents, the
Member States committed themselves to complying with the me-
dium-term requirements in relation to the government budget
status, which should remain close to balance or surplus, while en-
suring that the state budget deficit does not exceed 3% of GDP
(the so-called "preventive arm of the Pact"). These commitments
were taken by the countries under the Maastricht Treaty.
If a Member State violates the maximum permitted budget
deficit or public debt level, this country becomes subject to 
actions taken pursuant to the procedure for excessive budget deficit
elimination (the so-called "corrective arm of the Pact"). In case
of repeated violation of the rules, the European Commission may
recommend imposing sanctions on the country (by voting and
subject to support by two-thirds of voters, while the country in
default has no voting right at that). As a punishment, a fine in
the amount ranging from 0.3 to 0.5% of GDP may be imposed,
the demand on disclosing more details on budget expenditures
and debt may be set, or the European Investment Bank crediting
policy for the country may be revised. At that, force majeure cir-
cumstances may imply cases of natural disasters or serious eco-
nomic collapse.
Programs to ensure stability (or Convergence Programs for
countries outside the euro area) are provided to the European
Commission on an annual basis. While evaluating the provided
stability (convergence) programs, attention is also drawn to the
long-term sustainability of public finances. EU bodies provide
common long-term budget forecasts at the EU level, as well as
assess and monitor the situation in individual member countries.
The "preventive" arm of the Pact requires EU countries to
adopt balanced budgets, and if possible — with a surplus in order
                     ∗ Regulation 1466/97: On the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the sur-
veillance and coordination of economic policies (the so-called “preventive arm” of the Pact) and Regula-
tion 1467/97 on the processing of budget deficit data, if the Member State exceeds the threshold set at 3%
of gross domestic product (the so-called “corrective arm”).
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to create certain reserves for the cases of business activity drop. The 
"corrective" arm comprises the procedure for deficit correction, 
i.e. restricting thereof by 3% of GDP by virtue of emer-gency 
measures. However, the "Achilles' heel" of the Pact was
absence of a mechanism to compel adherence to the fiscal disci-
pline. In particular, to apply certain penalties to the offender the
European Commission must first enlist the support of European
Commissioners, and this contributes to soft-pedaling sanctions
against individual countries. In addition, adopting such a deci-
sion requires qualified voting majority, while under circumstances
when "the offender" is not deprived of the right to vote in the
case, finding additional "contra" votes from other countries po-
tentially being "offenders" is not a big problem. Moreover, among
offenders are not only such "problem" countries as Greece (maxi-
mum budget deficit reached 12.7% and the debt — 142.8% of
GDP), Portugal (9.1% and 93%) or Ireland (deficit — 32.4%),
but also the relatively successful Germany (12.7% and 83.2%),
France (7.0% and 81.7%) and Austria (4.6 and 72.3%). Therefore
it is no accident that, according to experts, the first decade of the
euro functioning (1999-2007) could be dubbed a "wasted period
of time", which might have been efficiently used for building a
sound fiscal system instead of resorting to mutual concessions and
compromises.11 In this regard, "many experts recognize that the
fiscal integration deepening may contribute to essential increasing
stability of the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe"12.
Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact was first se-
riously criticized in 2002-2005, as France and the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany repeatedly violated the criteria for keeping the
budget deficit at 3% of GDP, while the Ecofin Council refused to
impose sanctions against them despite recommendations of the
European Commission. The dispute between the European Coun-
cil and the European Commission (with lawsuit filed by the 
latter) was considered by the European Court, which in essence
agreed with the position of the European Commission, but
pointed to the need for a clearer distribution of responsibilities
between the two EU bodies (the lack of which led to a similar
"stalemate" situation in the case of Italy). It would, however, be
wrong to believe that the established rules had been of no effec-
tiveness at all. A number of countries (including Belgium, Spain
                     
11 Schuknecht L., Moutot Ph., Rother Ph., Stark J. The Stability and Growth Pact. Crisis and Re-
form// ECB – Occasional Paper, No. 129/September, 2011, p.10 – [Electronic resource]. Access mode:
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp129.pdf
12 Khudyakova L.S., Sidorova E.A. The reform of financial sector regulation in the European Union
//Dengi i kredit, No. 4, 2014, p.33. [In Russian].
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and Austria) have succeeded in complying with the set require-
ments and managed to consolidate their financial resources so as
to avoid excessive deficits. Moreover, Ireland, Luxembourg and
Finland, which had experienced fiscal problems before, managed
to improve their finances and join the euro area even with budget
surpluses (although, Belgium and Luxembourg suffered budget
deficit later again)13.
As a result of the judgment (under pressure from Germany and
France) the rules were softened. In particular, the Ecofin Council
agreed that the 3% ceiling of GDP for budget deficit and 60% of
GDP for public debt are recognized officially, but are also sub-
ject to additional criteria, under which the deficit is recognized
as excessive, namely: cyclically adjusted budget behavior, debt
level, slow growth period duration, progress in implementing
market-oriented pension reforms and the possibility of the deficit
being related to productivity increase procedures. Thus, decisions
on sanctions should be adopted after consideration of a set of in-
dicators (both objective and subjective). The Council decided
that as a rule, the term for excessive deficit correction should fall
within one year after identification thereof and thus, normally,
expire on the second year after deficit occurrence. The Council
also agreed that the elements to be taken into account when de-
termining the initial term for the excessive deficit correction
should be more specific and include, in particular, overall 
assessment of all the factors mentioned in the report under 
Art. 104 (3).
As a benchmark, countries with excessive budget deficits shall
be obliged to apply fiscal efforts in order to achieve annual
minimum deficit reduction by at least 0.5% of GDP (a cyclically
adjusted indicator). If the said efforts prove sufficient to correct
the excessive deficit in the year following identification thereof,
the initial term need not be set beyond this year14. At the summit
held during March 22-23, 2005, the European Commission en-
dorsed this decision and made appropriate changes to the "pre-
ventive arm" of the Pact. In particular, this concerned 
introducing a number of fundamental concepts used in the 
decision-making process15:
                     
13 Morris R., Ongena N., Schuknecht L. The Reform and Implementation of the Stability and Growth
Pact – European Central Bank, Occasional Paper No. 47, June 2006, p.18 – [Electronic resource]. Access
mode: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp47.pdf
14 Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact / Ecofin Report , 22-23 March
2005,p.18 – [Electronic resource]. Access mode: http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/
2005/03/21stab/stab.pdf
15 Report on Public finances in EMU 2005// European Economy No. 3, 2005, pp. 83-84 – [Electronic
resource]. Access mode: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication421_en.pdf
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• Country-specific Medium-Term budgetary Objectives —
MTO's. By the time (during 1999-2004) the Pact used to set
forth the same objective for member states — "maintaining the
budget state close to balance". Now, the objective was to be set
along with consideration of "economic and budgetary positions
and sustainability risks of the Member States" based on the cur-
rent ratio of public debt to GDP and long-term potential GDP
growth, while the overall objective in the medium term remained
the same — maintaining a "state close to equilibrium". The exact
calculation formula was not provided, however, but it was em-
phasized that the MTO upper limit should remain at the level
providing a safety margin for continued compliance with the
deficit limit of 3% of the state budget, while ensuring stability of
the budget in the long term. In addition, the respective EC regu-
lation stipulated that the MTO upper limit for the euro area
states or ERM II for EMU-2 member states may not exceed 1%
of GDP (in structural deficit), if the country is faced with a
combination of low debt and high potential growth (or vice
versa). At the same time, if subject to increasing age-related
sustainability risks (i.e. those related to growing average age of
the population) in the long term, the upper MTO limit should
ensure budget balance or surplus. Eventually, it was decided that
each member country should choose own MTO objectives in pre-
senting its annual report on the implementation of the conver-
gence/sustainability program, whereas a recommendation was
also provided that governments always choose a more ambitious
MTO level compared to the upper MTO limit, as long as it is
more suitable for their medium-term fiscal policy.• Minimum annual budgetary effort for countries that have
not yet reached the medium-term objectives — MTO. All member
states agreed that fiscal and tax consolidation of the budget
should be carried out, as long as there are favorable economic
conditions for that matter, i.e. during periods when the real
growth exceeds the average potential long-term growth. The rule
concerning windfall revenues was also agreed upon, while im-
plying that such funds should be spent directly on reduction of
both public deficits and debt. Moreover, a special rule for the
euro area states and EMU-2 member states implied they under-
take to implement annual improvements as to their structural
deficit at the level of at least 0.5% of GDP.
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Report on deficit and debt
Article 104 (5)


































Fig. 1. Excessive deficit procedure sequence of actions
(by the Maastricht Treaty articles)
Source: Morris R., Ongena N., Schuknecht L. The Reform and Implementation of
the Stability and Growth Pact — European Central Bank, Occasional Paper No. 47,
June 2006, p.17
• Early-warning system. The previously existing early warning
system for potential violations of budget deficits was expanded
and it was agreed that the system be based on the analysis of ten
macroeconomic indicators. In addition, the European Commission
has been granted the right to express its "opinion" to member
states without discussing this issue at the European Council in
situations where such an opinion serves as a formal recommenda-
tion for achieving the previously announced MTO. This implies
that the Commission will be expressing its opin-
ion/recommendation not only in situations of the 3% ceiling vio-
lation acute risk, but also in cases when its experts detect unjus-
tified lower-scale deviations.• Structural reforms. With the purpose of carrying out the
necessary structural reforms, it was decided that the implementa-
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tion of major structural reforms (provided those have a direct
long-term savings effect) should automatically grant the right to
temporary deviation from the MTO or correction thereof by the
amount equal to implementation cost of the structural reforms
(subject to maintaining the 3% ceiling and achieving the origi-
nally set MTO over the next four years).
At the same time changes were made to the "corrective arm" of
the Pact, including: 1) in the definition of "excessive deficit" the
concept of "severe economic recession" was revised as was the role
of "other significant factors" — including tasks of the Lisbon
Agenda or innovation programs; 2) the possibility of one-year
prolonging the term for deficit correction was envisaged; 3) con-
siderations related to the assessment of systemic pension reforms
were added (with a view to ensure that budget deficits are cor-
rected by the amounts of the corresponding costs on such reforms
during the first five years); and 4) the need to ensure fiscal and
debt sustainability was emphasized (along with demand for re-
ducing the existing debts to a level of 60% of GDP)16.
Finally, the control and monitoring system has been improved
in terms of fiscal (in particular, peer support) and statistical (in-
creased transparency of budget information) aspects17.
However, the reform of 2005 was undermined already in 2007
by the actions of France, which started stimulating national
economy through financial measures, which led to significant de-
viations from the indicators provided for by the Pact. With the
onset of the economic crisis in 2008 such behavior of the EU
member states has become virtually commonly accepted.
During the 2001-2012 period the rule regarding public debt re-
striction (60% of GDP) was broken 92 times by twelve of the
seventeen euro area countries, whereas the rule as to the 3%
budget deficit was breached 75 times by fifteen countries. How-
ever, the particular importance was vested in financial integration
deepening as a result of the 2007-2012 global debt crisis aggrava-
tion. The signal for European debt crisis onset was given by the
statement of the New Greek government in October 2009, when
it appeared that the budget deficit was actually twice as large
than the previous government had claimed and reached 12% of
GDP. Thus, after several years of uncontrolled budget spending
and failure to carry out reforms Greece was the first country in
the euro area heading towards the destructive consequences of the
                     
16 Ibid., pp. 84, 87-90
17 Ibid., pp. 90-91
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economic crisis18. Soon, similar problems arose in Portugal (with
deficit over 6% of GDP) and in Spain (11%). In Ireland, the
deficit actually exceeded 30% of GDP (however, in this country
the deficit formation was mainly due to the unsuccessful attempt
of the state to support bankrupt financial institutions). These
countries affected by the crisis have formed the group of "periph-
eral" EU member states in crisis known as GIPS (or politically
incorrect — PIGS). After similar problems had arisen in Italy, the
group became known as PIIGS.
In the euro area, the sovereign debt crisis has been particularly
destructive, while affecting not only financial but also social
sphere and political processes. EU political leaders declared their
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Indeed, it was the crisis that gave a powerful impetus to fur-
ther process of economic (in particular, budgetary and fiscal)
consolidation of 28 EU countries. In order to overcome budgetary
                     
18 European Debt Crisis Explained//Investment Contrarians – [Electronic resource]. Access mode:
http://www.investmentcontrarians. com/european-debt-crisis-explained/
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imbalances several general principles of the European Union were
reviewed; in cooperation with the IMF loans were granted to
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and other indebted countries, as well as
to the banking sector in Spain. In particular, Greece which found
itself on the verge of default in 2011 appealed for aid to the
European Union and IMF, thus receiving circa USD 240 billion.
Moreover, European banks have written off 53.5% of the private
sector debts of Greece. Ireland, which also faced onset of the fi-
nancial (banking) crisis, has requested EUR 67.5 billion of aid.
Spain turned for assistance in the amount of EUR 100 billion (al-
though later it was limited to the amount of EUR 41 billion).
Portugal requested EUR 78 billion and carried out quite an effec-
tive reform program. In particular, the request for financial assis-
tance was sent to the IMF and the European Commission along
with a development and stability program after the Socialist gov-
ernment of Josй Socrates in Portugal had resigned in March 2011
(though kept on performing duties till the early elections). The
program had been developed two months in advance and agreed
with the opposition. Although the opposition (Social Democrats)
was not invited to the government, the need to achieve national
consensus was clearly understood. Representatives of the IMF,
European Commission and European Central Bank who came to
Portugal in May agreed upon the program presented lending con-
ditions and asked to endorse those both by the government
(which still could manage to get the first tranche) and the oppo-
sition, which had solid chances to come to power in late June.
Actually that was what later happened and the new Social
Democratic government started developing a new program, which
presented a modernized (and a more rigid) version of the previous
government's program and was also agreed upon by the opposi-
tion — now the Socialists. Thus, eventually the crisis overcoming
program proved not only more radical (in terms of budgetary
savings and speed of the planned reforms) than initially proposed
by the IMF experts, but really of national scale (such that met
real objectives of the government and was acceptable (at least in
terms of basic parameters) to the political opposition. As a result
of strong measures, Portugal budget deficit in 2013 was reduced
to 2.6% of GDP, which was below the level specified in the pro-
gram (3%). The state's capability of providing for internal and
external funding also increased. Interest payments on government
obligations were significantly reduced: in late April of 2014 the
average yield on ten-year bonds placed by Portugal reached
3.58%, which was a record since early 2006. The share of exports
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in GDP has increased from 28% in 2009 to 41% in 2013. Manu-
facturing enterprises have improved their position in foreign mar-
kets (especially those of footwear industry), while the service
sector began to rapidly develop. A positive trend in the economy
implying return of foreign investors could be seen. So, it is not
surprising that Portugal was the first of the so-called EU South-
ern periphery countries to overcome major economic problems
and could afford to abandon the program of support by the IMF,
European Commission and European Central Bank in May 2014.
The response to the financial crisis in the euro area was deep-
ening of the fiscal and budgetary consolidation, an example of
which was establishment of the European Financial Stability Fa-
cility (EFSF) in 2011 to combat the crisis and next — transforma-
tion thereof into the improved and permanent European Stability
Mechanism (in September 2012). The functioning of these new
institutions and the nature of their financial support indicate that
EU countries have approached the new integration stage — en-
suring confederal stability budget.
A significant role in this process was vested in the European
Central Bank (ECB), which traditionally applied a strict mone-
tary approach to macroeconomic regulation. However, it departed
from the standard rules and introduced a new method implying
purchase of government bonds from crisis-affected countries and
filling their banks with adequate capital. Thus, the ECB has es-
sentially financed the deficit of the future common EU budget.
The formal commencement of the fiscal integration process can
probably be characterized by development of two versions of the
draft regulatory acts in September 2010 aimed at amending the
Stability and Growth Pact. The drafts were developed separately
by to work groups of the European Commission and the European
Council. In March 2011, the Ecofin Council prepared a prelimi-
nary draft agreement including a list of required regulatory
documents (dubbed "the six pack"∗) aimed at reducing budget
deficits and achieving macroeconomic balance.
Four of the six instruments were designed to further reform
the Stability and Growth Pact. This reform did not imply any
changes in the existing rules, but was intended to ensure stricter
                     ∗ 1. Regulation 1175/2011 amending Regulation 1466/97: On the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies.
2. Regulation 1177/2011 amending Regulation 1467/97: On speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure.
3. Regulation 1173/2011: On the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area.
4. Directive 2011/85/EU: On requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States.
5. Regulation 1176/2011: On the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.
6. Regulation 1174/2011: On enforcement action to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.
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adherence to financial discipline and systematization of the pro-
cedure for imposing sanctions. For instance, if a country found in
breach of the rules failed to exercise appropriate actions, it was
bound to place an interest-free deposit in the amount of 0.2% of
GDP. In case the required actions were still not implemented,
the deposit would be transformed into a fine. In addition, such
countries would be subject to restrictions as regards voting in the
EU Council, while their national standards of statistics were to
be harmonized with standard meeting EU requirements.
Another two documents of the "pack" were related to macro-
economic balancing procedure and early warning system.
Since 2011, the activities on monitoring and coordination of
the Pact implementation have been carried out under the so-
called "European Semester":
• In March, the European Council (heads of the EU states and
governments) sets priorities of the economic policy based on re-
spective reports. This provides the basis for receiving recommen-
dations on fiscal policy (stability and convergence programs) and
economic policy (national reform programs).
• In April, the Member States provide the Commission with
their medium-term budgetary and economic strategies based on
targeted recommendations. The Commission assesses plans of the
member countries and develops recommendations to the EU
Council as to voting on this.
• In June and July, the European Council and the Ecofin
Council carry out political consultations on common economic
and fiscal policies for specific countries. Assessment of compli-
ance with the recommendations will be implemented by the
Commission next year.
The next step toward improving fiscal discipline was made on
November 23, 2011, as the European Commission proposed an-
other two regulatory documents (the "Two-pack 19), which were
to introduce additional monitoring measures as to the budget pro-
cesses in the euro area countries. However, they entered into
force only in 2013 after implementation of the new requirements
to the common EU fiscal legislation. In particular, it is now re-
quired that the EMU member countries provide the European
Commission with a draft budget for next year not later than by
                     
19 1. Regulation 473/2013: On common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary
plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area.
2. Regulation 472/2013: On the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member
States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial
stability.
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October 15 (unless, of course, the country is subject to specific
requirements of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, EDP, or Exces-
sive Imbalance Procedure — EIP). Governments of the countries
subject to the above procedures have to provide respective reports
more frequently than under normal circumstances.
Eventually, it came to knowledge that France, Germany and
Italy intended to initiate establishment of a new Stability and
Growth Pact for the euro area, which would imply "severe sanc-
tions" against countries violating requirements thereof. In early
December 2011, Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, has
promised to create a fiscal union of the euro circulation countries.
At that, she strongly rejected the idea of introducing joint Euro-
bonds, while still acknowledging that the gradual evolution to-
ward Eurobonds was in full swing by itself. In turn, W. Schдu-
ble, the German Finance Minister, suggested that each member
state transfer its debt exceeding the limit of 60% of the national
GDP to the national redemption fund to be financed by the na-
tional target tax revenues in order to increase investor confidence
in the feasibility of debt repayment. His suggestion resembled
elements of the European redemption fund proposed by the Ger-
man Council of Economic Experts, however lacked the key ele-
ment — joint and several liability.
The French President N. Sarkozy has seemingly supported this
idea and stressed that the euro area countries should do their
budgeting in the same style while bearing in mind that they
would face severe automatic sanctions in case of violating budg-
eting rules. He also supported changes to the EU treaty and the
proposal to abolish the requirement for a qualified majority vote
in order to ensure prompter decision making by the member
states. However, of more critical essence was that Sarkozy did
not opine on the fiscal union. As the French minister made it
clear, France was deeply concerned about the idea that the Euro-
pean Commission would have a right both to review national
budgets and to veto them. That is, France, on the one hand,
seemingly supported introduction of severe automatic sanctions
for violations of budgetary discipline, but, on the other hand,
wished to retain the right of individual states to independent
budgeting. On analyzing these suggestions (as well as statements
of the German Bundestag oppositionists, who pointed out that
such gradualist approach would only exacerbate the debt crisis),
independent experts drew attention to the fact that the German
intention to supplement the EMU with a fiscal union may also
comprise joint liability, which would go beyond the narrow lim-
its set out by the European Stability Mechanism. Moreover, there
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were expectations of the growing recognition by the German gov-
ernment that the ESM's current design, which foresees public
debt restructuring of the euro area member states as a regular cri-
sis tool, is inconsistent with the euro's role as one of the world's
leading reserve currencies. However, the sequencing of reforms is
crucial and more joint liability may only come once binding fiscal
rules and national economic reforms are in place ensuring solid
public finances, and improved economic growth and employment
for all member states20.
On the same day (November 23), the European Commission
presented the "Green paper" concerning feasibility of establishing
joint bonds of the euro area countries ("Eurobonds" or "stability
bonds"). The stability bonds were defined therein as "a tool cre-
ated for daily financing general expenditures of the euro area
countries through joint issue"21. It was presumed that such joint
liability for government bonds would increase reliability, reduce
the cost of borrowing (interest rates) and improve fiscal disci-
pline (due to more stringent monitoring and control). The pro-
posal has caused quite a robust discussion and, therefore, in July
2012 the European Committee for Economic and Social Policy
provided the European Commission with its conclusions which, in
particular, envisaged continued political work on the said proj-
ect. At that, the Committee tended to the option, which would
stipulate joint liability of the euro area countries (in the form of
payment guarantees), but not with respect to all government
bonds of the euro area countries, but only to a portion thereof
(with the portion meeting certain criteria, which, however, were
never developed). Later, a proposal was put forward that the
first step should imply introducing common issue by the euro
area countries of eurobills — short-term instruments to finance
public debt with maturity term thereof varying from one to two
years. Introduction of eurobills would not require immediate and
complete integration of the fiscal policy.
In January 2012, a special Code of Conduct22 was issued (with
the final version thereof agreed in September of the same year)
presenting a detailed description of using the Stability and
                     
20 European fiscal union: what the experts say//theguardian.com, Friday 2 December – [Electronic
resource]. Access mode: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/dec/02/european-fiscal-union-
experts
21 Green paper on the feasibility of introducing stability bonds// European Commission, Brussels,
23.11.2011, p.3 – [Electronic resource]. Access mode: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/president/news/documents/pdf/ green_en.pdf
22 Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and Guidelines on the for-
mat and content of Stability and Convergence Programmes – [Electronic resource]. Access mode:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/code_of_conduct_en.pdf
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Growth Pact mechanisms. This document also comprised detailed
consideration of the basic concepts relating to the Pact as well as
recommendations regarding the content of stability and conver-
gence programs.
In March, 25 EU Member States (with the exception of Great
Britain and Czech Republic) signed an agreement to ensure
budgetary discipline known as the Fiscal Compact. The agree-
ment entered into force in January 2013 after ratification thereof
by twelve EU countries. Later on, the Compact was ratified by
almost all of the other EU countries, including Czech Republic.
Denmark and Romania declared accession to the Compact with-
out ratification, while Bulgaria declared itself bound to imple-
ment the agreement in part (although the three countries are not
euro area members, to which, in fact, the Fiscal Compact provi-
sions apply). The only opponent to the new rules was Great
Britain.
In practice however, everything is not as rosy. The matter is
that immediately after signing of the Compact, it had to be rati-
fied by Greece (which would not receive EU financial assistance
otherwise). However, the procedure of its implementation into
the national legislation was not carried out, which left a "legal
loophole" for neglecting the Compact in the future23. Given high
social tensions in the Greek society and quite a real threat of
Greece exiting the euro area, the European Commission did not
insist on full compliance with the legal formalities. Though, fur-
ther on the international lenders strictly controlled real imple-
mentation of the reform program, required by the Fiscal Compact
provisions24. However, a precedent had been created and Greece
was followed by Cyprus, Malta, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Belgium, Estonia and Romania. In particular, the need for ob-
serving the "golden rule" still in 2012 led to a government crisis
and early elections in the Netherlands. The Dutch parliament
faced the need to cut costs, since the budget deficit stood at
4.7%, but 11 parties in the parliament of the Netherlands dis-
agreed on the methods of budget savings. The most radical pro-
posals were submitted by socialists and nationalists. The Socialist
Party proposed not to reduce social spending, but to introduce a
tax on the rich and thus increase budget revenues. The Party for
                     
23 Burret H.T., Schnellenbach J. Implementation of the Fiscal Compact in the Euro Area Member
States//German Council for Economic Experts, Working Paper 08/2013, November 2013, p. 36 –
[Electronic resource]. Access mode: http://www.sachverstaendigenratwirtschaft.de/-fileadmin/dateiablage/
download/publikationen/arbeitspapier_08_2013_engl.pdf
24 Papadimitropoulou I. Eurogroup to examine the progress of Greece's fiscal adjustment program//
Times of Changes, 19.06.2014 – [Electronic resource]. Access mode: http://www.thetoc.gr-/
eng/politics/article/eurogroup-to-examine-the-progress-of-greeces-fiscal-adjustment-programme
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Freedom felt it was important to cut financial aid to migrants
making up to 10% of the population and to exit the euro zone. To
overcome the political gridlock, early elections were conducted.
Although they practically did not change the balance of power,
agreement on the budget was nonetheless reached. Despite the
fact that the majority did not want to ratify the Fiscal Compact,
its abandoning was practically impossible. Eventually, an original
solution was found — in March 2013 the parliament ratified the
Compact and on July 26 it was signed by the King, but the
document never became an obligatory legal norm for the Nether-
lands. The Compact was not implemented and remains recognized
by the Netherlands as an international legal instrument having no
priority over the national laws, i.e. compliance with the Compact
on the Dutch side is, in fact, a matter of "good will"25.
Sweden and Poland followed a somewhat different path — the
agreement was ratified and implemented, but the implementation
of the Covenant was postponed until accession of these countries
to the euro area.
Not everything went smooth in Germany, where fiscal union
opponents appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court with a
lawsuit arguing that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
was undermining Bundestag budgetary powers. However, in
March 2014 Karlsruhe Constitutional Court ruled that despite
the fact that the financial obligations of Germany as a result of
joining the Mechanism reached EUR 190 billion, the German
Bundestag budgetary autonomy remained sufficiently26.
The Fiscal Compact essence implies legislative consolidation of
the previous agreements on the so-called "golden fiscal rule",
which requires maintenance of public finance indicators within
rigid limits (budget deficit — within 3% of GDP, and the struc-
tural deficit below 0.5% of GDP), as well as on the "debt brake"
implying public debt limitation at the level of 60% of GDP. In
addition, while preparing the Fiscal Compact it was supposed
that budgets of all EU countries should be sent for approval to
the European Commission in Brussels before they get to the na-
tional parliaments. The suggestion was dramatically opposed by
Greece, Great Britain, Czech Republic and other countries, which
believed this procedure would infringe their sovereignty. For-
                     
25 The Golden Rule adopted in Dutch legislation?// Leiden University. Leiden Law Blogs,
05.10.2012 – [Electronic resource]. Access mode: http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/the-golden-rule-
adopted-in-dutch-legislation
26 Verfassungsgericht weist Klagen gegen ESM ab// Die Bundesregierung, 18. März 2014 –
[Electronic resource]. Access mode: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2014/03/2014-
03-18-bverfg-esm.html;jsessionid= 622BB9AA48A15170216D34D493E676DC.s3t1
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mally, this rule was cancelled, but in practice it still works, be-
cause draft budgets are still sent to the European Commission in
terms of monitoring compliance with the "golden rule".
Further budgetary and fiscal consolidation of the EU largely
depends on the position of Germany, which is now acting as its
main engine. Berlin advocates unconditional implementation of
the Fiscal Compact, ensuring compliance with all budgetary and
monetary constraints allowing to overcome the crisis by joint ef-
fort. The German government also supports transfer of sovereign
powers in the financial sector to supranational bodies. These ap-
proaches are not always admired by their partners in the Euro-
pean Union which are not in a position to restore order in their
public finances, and sometimes European officials in Brussels join
them as well. Actions of Germany are often counterweighed by
the alliance of France, Italy and Spain. For example, a conflict
arose concerning potential issue of Eurobonds and establishment
of the so-called "transfer union". The Germans grow increasingly
more blamed for the negative effects of measures aimed at budget
funds saving.
The third largest economy of the EU — Great Britain occupies
a special position. Since the moment of joining EU, Great Britain
has been continuously inhibiting all the integration measures, es-
pecially in the monetary and budgetary spheres. The sovereign
debt crisis has led to intensification of London’s European inte-
gration process suspension. The British government has not
signed the Fiscal Compact and, occasionally, raises the issue of
potential exit from the EU.
Thus, the fiscal union creation has been formally completed,
but in fact its members are faced with hard work on practical
implementation of the mutual obligations as well as on estab-
lishment of mechanisms and tools that would ensure implementa-
tion of the "golden rule" and use of the "debt brake" without
causing irreparable damage to the national economy and socio-
economic state of society.
Today the EU financial system is a complex system of interna-
tional relations and international institutions, whose task is to
protect common interests of the member states in all areas of fi-
nancial relations: lending and investment, international payments
and exchange rate policy coordination, harmonizing rules of con-
trol over banking institutions, combating tax evasion and money
laundering, budgetary policy coordination and so on. Significant
changes in the geo-economic structure of the world, in particular,
rapid growth of economic competition on the part of China and
worsening of domestic political and economic problems within
OLEKSANDR SHAROV 
THE EUROPEAN FISCAL UNION CREATION PROCESS 95
the EU (failure of the EU Constitution, the banking and debt
crisis of periphery countries, etc.), pose fundamental problems to
the EU concerning correction of the European integration model.
Thus, one can say that at present the European Union is at the
bifurcation point, the passage of which proves possible only in
one of two directions: further federalization and advancement
towards the ‘United States of Europe’ or consolidating of the po-
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Fig. 3. Budget deficit of Ukraine (% of GDP)
Source: Ministry of Finance of Ukraine
Conclusion
What will the European Union financial integration scenario
look like is to be seen already in the near future. However, the
specified prospects of the European Union financial system mod-
ernization raise the need for certain steps on the part of the rele-
vant financial authorities in Ukraine, arising from the EU inte-
gration objectives.
In the field of budgetary policy it should first of all concern
attempts for ensuring compliance with the fiscal discipline crite-
ria adopted in the European Union (although such requirements
do not arise from the current objectives of Ukraine’s integration
into the EU). However, until recently it has not looked too diffi-
cult for the Ukrainian side, as the national debt during recent
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years ranged from 12 to 40% of GDP (never going beyond this
limit), which is significantly lower than the same figure for the
vast majority of EU countries (except Poland). As for the budget
deficit, over the 2006-2012 period it amounted on the average to
2.6% of GDP (i.e. stayed strictly within the Maastricht criteria).
However, recent events related to the annexation of Crimea by
Russia and military operations in the area of anti-terrorist opera-
tion in the eastern Ukraine have significantly worsened the state
of the economy, resulting in the expected growth of the budget
deficit. However, the government expects to achieve limiting
thereof to 3% of GDP in a year, while the foreign debt is ex-
pected to be kept within 55% of GDP until 2017.
Regarding organization of the budgeting process, the short-
term objectives include development of medium-term budget
forecasting (planning) system, improving program-oriented ap-
proach to the budgeting process and analyzing effectiveness and
efficiency of budget programs as well as improving exchange of
information and experience on planning and meeting of the
budget and public debt-related tasks. All the above should ensure
development of the public internal control and external audit sys-
tem based on international (European) standards and their com-
patibility with the fundamental principles of accountability,
transparency, economy, efficiency and effectiveness. In particular,
this implies the need for implementation of standards and meth-
ods of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institu-
tions (INTOSAI) and use of the EU experience in the field of ex-
ternal control and audit of public finances (while emphasizing
independence of the relevant authorities). It is also essential to
further develop the public internal financial control system
through harmonization with the standards taking into account
general European practice and agreed with the Institute of Inter-
nal Auditors (IIA), the International Federation of Accountants
(IFAC) and the International Organization of Supreme Audit In-
stitutions (INTOSAI).
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